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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No.960746-CA

vs.

:

CHARLOTTE MARLENE LONGSHAW, :
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LONGSHAW

ARGUMENT
This brief addresses only those issues presented in appellee's
response brief that are not addressed
brief.

in appellant's

original

For all issues not addressed here appellant relies on the

original brief.
I.

The Misstatements Made by the Prosecution
During
Closing Arguments
Were
of Grave
Prejudice to Marlene Longshaw.

While the State recognizes that Mr. Christensen's argument to
the Jury in this matter contained a clear misstatement of law, they
desire

this

Court

to believe

that

the

reading

of

a

terribly

confusing jury instruction, followed by proclaiming to the Jury
that

the

instruction

shows

he

was

correct

in

his

previous

statement, all accompanied by crossing out the lesser included
offenses on the chart prepared by the defense, somehow corrects the

misstatement.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

The entire defense of Ms. Longshaw was based on her state of
mind.

There was never any question that she had shot Mr. Stewart.

There were 4 0 people in the room at the time of the incident.

Her

defense, instead, was always based on whether her state of mind
required a conviction of a lower offense level, primarily that of
Manslaughter.

To this end, the defense carefully established a

string of factors which affected Ms. Longshaw's ability to function
and to appreciate her acts on this day in question.

These included

her grief, her mental condition, and also the Soma and Valium she
had ingested that morning.
of these

Each of these, and the combined effect

factors were proper considerations

for the jury when

looking at the state of mind requirements for conviction.

It is

the intent of the law that voluntary intoxication has an impact on
an individual's
murder.1

state of mind for the purpose of first degree

It can for this crime be a defense.

It is however, not

a defense to the crimes of manslaughter and negligent homicide.
Id.
The difficultly with the argument of the prosecutor in this
case is that it turns the statute on its head and uses somewhat
confusing language to further mislead and confuse the Jury.
Jury should have properly considered all of the factors

The

including

voluntary intoxication to determine if the Ms. Longshaw's conduct

1

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306.
2

was "reckless" as opposed to with "grave indifference" in the
analysis of a lessor included offense to murder.

It is important

in looking at what occurred to do so in careful context.
Mr. Mooney fails on his diagram
what voluntary intoxication also
regard to criminally negligent
homicide.
Basically it does
negligent homicide all together.
you read the instruction on that -

to mention
does with
types of
away with
Even when
-

(R. 1651)
This is the part that the State admits to be in error.
is at this point that the defense objected. Id.
response

to

the

objection

instructs

the

Jury

And it

The Judge in
to

follow

the

instructions.
It is here that the State insists that counsel corrected his
misstatement.

But this is not the case.

He doesn't tell the Jury,

"I'm sorry", or "I was wrong", he tells them instead "Let's clear
that up". Id.

Then he reads the instruction, stopping in the part

of the instruction that mentions the word recklessness, and states
"manslaughter here is recklessness" referring to the chart.

Then

to underscore rather than correct the misstatement, he goes on:
Again, ladies and gentlemen, I have correctly
stated the law to you. And negligent homicide
for voluntary intoxication doesn't apply. And
the
first
element
of manslaughter,
her
recklessness doesn't apply.
(R. 1652) And

as he

speaks, he

crosses

out manslaughter

negligent homicide on the chart before the Jury.

3

and

The clear impression the Jury was left with was that if there
is voluntary intoxication then you may not find manslaughter based
on recklessness, leaving the Jury instead with murder even though
they may have felt recklessness was present, because and only
because the intoxication may have played a role.
This argument was of grave prejudice to Ms. Longshaw.
in the rebuttal portion of the argument.
for

correction

of

the misstatement

in

It came

There was no opportunity
subsequent

argument

by

defense counsel; the Jury instead is left to try to figure it out
on their own.

The instruction of the Judge also does not help, it

only tells the jury to look at the instructions, but the prosecutor
had

already

instruction.

given

them

an

incorrect

interpretation

of

the

He is a lawyer, he is representing the State - surely

the Jury is safe in thinking they can believe him, and if he says
that

the

presence

of

intoxication

does

away

with

the

lesser

included charges then why should they think otherwise?
The State argues as well, that because the statement went to
the recklessness prong, that the Jury could still find manslaughter
based upon the other prongs of the statute..2
begs the question.
to

the

But this argument

Ms. Longshaw argued the issue of recklessness

Jury, had a chart

on the

state

of mind

to

help

them

understand the difference between the state of mind required for
murder and the reckless state of mind found in manslaughter, and

2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205(1) (b)-(c) .
4

was entitled to have the Jury evaluate this defense clear from
improper argument that distorts the law.
The State relies on the case of State
(Utah App 1991) to support its position.

v.

Haston,

In Haston,

811 P.2d 929
the prosecutor

made a misstatement to the jury, i.e. that intoxication could not
be considered as a defense to a charge of murder based on depraved
indifference. Supra

at

933.

After objection,

"the trial judge failed to expressly rule on
whether the prosecutor misstated the law, the
judge called the attention of the jury to the
written instructions which addressed the
burden of persuasion for an affirmative
defense.
The court's response to defense
counsel's
objection
did
not
directly
contradict the prosecutor or correct his
misstatement, as may have been appropriate."
Supra

at

933.

The Court went on to point out that the Judge's

statement had put the focus back on the instructions rather than
the argument of counsel, and that even such a weak response, when
coupled with the overwhelming evidence, was sufficient to negate
prejudice.

In

defendant was not

Haston,

the

prosecution

had

argued

that

the

intoxicated, and the evidence did not support

intoxication, therefore, the defense based on intoxication was not
applicable, and it didn't matter

that the jury may have been

confused about its impact.
In the instant matter, the prosecution never disputed that Ms.
Longshaw was intoxicated; they are the ones that pursued in detail
her history of drug use (R. 1166-1167, 1169-1170, 1173-1174); they

5

then argued that the state of intoxication did away with the other
offenses, and after the instruction of the Judge, which did not
correct the prosecutor's statement, the prosecutor continued to
insist that he was correct.

Any implication that the Jury can

figure out the correct law from the instructions is turned on its
head when the prosecutor makes misstatements, then after the Judge
fails to correct him, but merely points the Jury back to the
instructions, he continues to insist that he is correct.
The prosecution also argues that voluntary intoxication was
not a factor in the case because it was not supported by the
evidence,

but

this

fails

to

recognize

that

this

was

not

argument that the prosecution made at the time of trial.

the
The

prosecution never disputed that Ms. Longshaw was intoxicated but
they

did

make

the

argument

for

the

incorrect

principle

manslaughter was not an available option. (R. 1651-1652).

that

For the

State not to dispute at trial that she was intoxicated, and then
later on appeal argue that the prosecution's misstatements about
the effect of intoxication on the Jury's ability to decide the case
don't rise to the level of prejudice because the evidence does not
support intoxication is a reversal of position that ought not be
allowed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons here and in appellant's original brief, this
matter should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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